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ESSAY 
FIRST AMENDMENT FREEZE PLAY:  
BENNETT’S STRATEGY FOR ENTRENCHING INEQUALITY 
FRANK PASQUALE† 
Rick Perlstein has described American elections as the “[p]lutocrats’ 
[r]ight to [c]hoose.”1 Conservative media and academics have also lamented 
the influence of a rising politico-economic elite.2 A system premised on the 
trading of money for power, and power for money, can generate oligarchy or 
worse.3 Political science responds with “investor theories” of politics,4 where 
the key players are not the voters, but the donors.5 Politicians become vessels 
for their agendas.6 
 
† Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. 
1 Rick Perlstein, The New Holy Grail of Republican Primaries, WASH. MONTHLY: TEN MILES 
SQUARE (July 30, 2015), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ten-miles-square/2015/07/the_new_holy_
grail_of_republic056840.php [https://perma.cc/4ATQ-KXJK]. 
2 See generally RICHARD W. PAINTER, TAXATION ONLY WITH REPRESENTATION (2016) 
(presenting a conservative case for reforming the campaign finance system as a way of restoring self-
governance); Blake Neff, Bill Clinton Was Paid More Than $16 MILLION by a For-Profit College 
Company, DAILY CALLER (Aug. 3, 2015), http://dailycaller.com/2015/08/03/bill-clinton-was-paid-
more-than-16-million-by-a-for-profit-college-company [https://perma.cc/YK8Q-9DUD]. 
3 See Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 
669, 671 (2014) (“The constitutional problem of oligarchy is the danger that concentrations of 
economic power and political power may be mutually reinforcing . . . .”). 
4 See, e.g., THOMAS FERGUSON, GOLDEN RULE: THE INVESTMENT THEORY OF PARTY 
COMPETITION AND THE LOGIC OF MONEY-DRIVEN POLITICAL SYSTEMS 27 (1995). 
5 See, e.g., Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 77 (2004) (“The donor class effectively selects which candidates will be viable 
through large hard money contributions.”). 
6 See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest 
Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 576 (2014), http://scholar.princeton.edu/
sites/default/files/mgilens/files/gilens_and_page_2014_-testing_theories_of_american_politics.doc.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/359T-E6CT] (concluding from an empirical analysis of policy outcomes that “the 
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When the public can see the law as a “witness and external deposit of our 
moral life,” the legitimacy of our Constitution, courts, Congress, and 
administration is enhanced.7 That legitimacy in turn empowers each of these 
instruments of government to better secure ethical values in law. A virtuous 
cycle prevails. On the other hand, when politics produces little more than a 
modus vivendi, crafted to reflect and reinforce the interests of the most 
powerful persons in society, law’s legitimacy suffers. As the legitimacy of legal 
institutions declines, they are less able to defend the political process from a 
parasitic and cynical pluralism.8 This creates a vicious circle familiar all the 
way back to Aristotle, who modeled the descent of democracy into oligarchy, 
aristocracy, and tyranny.9 
When the Supreme Court hears cases on campaign financing, these 
fundamental dynamics of democratic theory should be at the core of its 
concerns.10 Justice Elena Kagan reflected these themes in the opening of her 
brilliant dissent in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 
decided 5–4 at the end of the 2011 term.11 But they were sidelined by a cynical 
and incoherent majority committed to freezing into place inequalities in voice 
and influence. Now that one key voice within that majority has left the Court, 
it is time to reconsider Bennett with the same degree of respect for precedent 
that the majority gave to other milestones of campaign finance jurisprudence. 
In Bennett, a PAC challenged an Arizona law offering additional funding 
to publicly funded candidates if their privately financed opponents exceeded 
a certain spending threshold.12 As Justice Roberts’s majority opinion 
explained: 
[d]uring the general election, matching funds are triggered when the amount 
of money a privately financed candidate receives in contributions, combined 
with the expenditures of independent groups made in support of the privately 
financed candidate or in opposition to a publicly financed candidate, exceed the 
general election allotment of state funds to the publicly financed candidate.13 
 
7 O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). 
8 See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 280-98 (1989) (discussing 
the theory of pluralism). 
9 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. III, pt. VII, at 61 (Benjamin Jowett, trans., Batoche Books 1999) 
(c. 350 B.C.E.). 
10 Cf. David Schultz, The Case for a Democratic Theory of American Election Law, 164 U. PA. L. 
REV. ONLINE 259 (2016), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/164-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-259.pdf. 
11 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2829 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting). The case’s technical veneer has obscured 
its fundamental importance to the future of campaign finance jurisprudence. 
12 Id. at 2814 (majority opinion). 
13 Id. “Once matching funds are triggered, each additional dollar that a privately financed 
candidate spends during the primary results in one dollar in additional state funding to his publicly 
financed opponent (less a 6% reduction meant to account for fundraising expenses).” Id. 
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Matching funds were only provided up to three times the initial allocation 
of state funding.14 
Note that the Arizona matching funds statute did not limit the spending 
of privately financed candidates. It also imposed several limits on candidates 
who accepted public financing (including a limit on their expenditure of 
personal funds of $500, and an overall expenditure cap).15 Nevertheless, 
Roberts’s majority opinion described the statute as unconstitutionally 
burdensome on the privately financed candidates’ speech: 
       Once a privately financed candidate has raised or spent more than the 
State’s initial grant to a publicly financed candidate, each personal dollar 
spent by the privately financed candidate results in an award of almost one 
additional dollar to his opponent. That plainly forces the privately financed 
candidate to shoulder a special and potentially significant burden when 
choosing to exercise his First Amendment right to spend funds on behalf of 
his candidacy.16 
By the Court’s reasoning, state aid to the publicly financed candidate 
suddenly deters the privately financed candidate’s speech once it goes above 
the initial allotment. But why allow any public funding, under that logic? As 
soon as there is any public financing, a privately financed candidate may 
decide not to run at all.17 That is precisely the type of speculative harm to 
speech that Roberts’s opinion takes seriously—however implausible it may be 
as a matter of genuine democratic theory or empirical research. 
The majority opinion aggressively expanded the Court’s already activist 
approach to striking down opportunity-promoting election law. Prior 
campaign finance jurisprudence—strained as it was—at least paid lip service 
to the ideal of promoting more speech by striking down expenditure and 
contribution limits.18 In Bennett, the Court announced that even speech 
promotion could be trumped by another, higher purpose: 
 
14 Id. at 2825. 
15 Id. at 2814. 
16 Id. at 2818 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Note that the speculative harms to 
privately financed speech, taken so seriously in Bennett, should now drive a complementary worry 
in a more liberal court—that without a scheme like Arizona’s matching funds, candidates who would 
add to speech by running with meaningful public financing may never materialize. That rationale 
alone should be grounds for overruling Bennett, given the weakness of the Court’s other arguments, 
and its failure to even consider the mirror image of its “discouraged candidates” rationale for striking 
down the matching funds. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, and two can play at 
the game of extrapolating dire consequences with barely a passing reference to social scientific 
literature (either domestic or international) on campaign financing. 
17 As Justice Kagan’s dissent observed, “privately funded candidates may well find the lump-sum system 
more burdensome than Arizona’s (assuming the lump is big enough).” Id. at 2838 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
18 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010) (“The rule that political speech 
cannot be limited based on a speaker’s wealth is a necessary consequence of the premise that the 
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[E]ven if the matching funds provision did result in more speech by publicly 
financed candidates and more speech in general, it would do so at the expense 
of impermissibly burdening (and thus reducing) the speech of privately 
financed candidates and independent expenditure groups. This sort of 
“beggar thy neighbor” approach to free speech—“restrict[ing] the speech of 
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of 
others”—is “wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”19 
From an ordinary language perspective, Roberts has strained the meaning 
of “restrict” beyond all recognition. The Arizona matching funds law did 
nothing to restrict the speech of private speakers. All it did was slightly 
rebalance the playing field once they spent above a certain threshold. 
Roberts’s reading comprehension is also strikingly weak here. He is elevating 
a specification of the anti-restriction principle from Buckley v. Valeo—do not 
restrict some persons’ speech in order to promote others20—into its own, 
independent First Amendment principle. 
Justice Kagan rightly expressed bafflement at the majority’s opinion in her 
stinging dissent. As she explained: 
The burden on speech in Davis—the penalty that campaign spending 
triggered—was the discriminatory contribution restriction, which Congress 
could not otherwise have imposed. By contrast, the thing triggered here is a 
non-discriminatory subsidy, of a kind this Court has approved for almost  
four decades.21 
Even more importantly, Justice Kagan treats “equalizing campaign 
speech” as the type of government interest that can help justify public funding, 
not render it suspect.22 
However, there is a silver lining in Justice Roberts’s agonistic misreading 
of Buckley.23 The majority once and for all dispenses with a naïvely 
 
First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s 
identity.”); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 739 (2008) (describing limitations on self-financing 
candidates as a “drag on First Amendment rights”). 
19 Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2821 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976)). 
20 See 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (“[T]he concept that the government may restrict the speech of 
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of other is wholly foreign to the 
First Amendment . . . .”). 
21 Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2840-41 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing Davis, 554 U.S. 724). 
22 Id. at 2845. 
23 Harold Bloom developed the concept of “agonistic misprision” to describe a way in which 
writers can escape the anxiety of being overly influenced by past great works, by pretending to 
interpret them faithfully, while in fact aggressively misreading them. HAROLD BLOOM, THE 
ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY, at xxiv (1997). The idea has been applied in 
legal settings where the form of respect for precedent is maintained while the substance is drained 
from it—a point Justice Kagan makes repeatedly in her dissent regarding the majority’s treatment 
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“deliberativist” conception of campaign finance law that has hindered 
development of an egalitarian rationale to support money in politics 
regulations. As I explained in Reclaiming Egalitarianism, both democratic 
theory and legal theory took a long detour into “deliberative democracy” and 
“republicanism” (respectively) from the 1980s to the 2000s as an allegedly 
nonpartisan, neutral rationale for many forms of election regulation—including 
restrictions on campaign finance.24 Going back to the work of Alexander 
Meiklejohn, it is easy to see how structure and rules can lead to better public 
debates.25 But deliberativism was, by and large, a dead end, since it could so 
easily be hijacked into a rationale for deregulation.26 For example, the 
majority in Citizens United agonized over state efforts to shape the public 
sphere, and proudly proclaimed that, in striking down campaign finance 
limitations, it was guaranteeing “more speech.”27 Bennett finally let that 
Kabuki mask drop, and revealed the ugly face of campaign deregulation: a 
Court committed to freezing into place extant disparities in resources. 
However appealing such a position may be as a crystalline expression of 
neoliberalism, it is deeply troubling in a polity like the United States—where, 
to take but one example, wealth disparities afflicting African-Americans 
reflect decades of racism sponsored by the state, and all too often reinforced 
by private sector nonfeasance and malfeasance. 
At this point, reformers face a crossroads. One option is to press for far 
greater public subsidies, unkeyed to the spending of privately financed 
candidates. From a purely fiscal point of view, this would be an entirely 
reasonable course of action. According to one advocacy group, “public 
financing would cost less than $10 a year for each taxpayer in the United 
States.”28 That is almost certainly a lowball estimate, even if it is only meant 
for federal elections—at least $7 billion was spent in 2012 on federal 
campaigns.29 But even if we were to assume an exceptionally high estimate 
for future federal and state elections, it is hard to see the program needing 
 
of Davis, the “millionaire’s amendment” case which it said controlled Bennett. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 
2840-41 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
24 Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 622-30, 657-60. 
25 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO  
SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). 
26 See, e.g., Pasquale, supra note 24, at 600-01. 
27 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010) (“[I]t is our law and our tradition that more 
speech, not less, is the governing rule.”). 
28 Joan Mandle, Answering the Critics, DEMOCRACY MATTERS, http://www.democracymatters.org/
what-you-need-to-know-about-money-in-politics-2/overview/answering-the-critics [https://perma.cc/53LC-
7ZR2] (last visited Apr. 16, 2016). 
29 Press Release, FEC, FEC Summarizes Campaign Activity of the 2011-2012 Election Cycle 
(updated Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.fec.gov/press/press2013/20130419_2012-24m-Summary.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/P3NN-PRWM]. 
220 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online  [Vol. 164: 215 
more than $20 billion per presidential election year. Given that the United 
States has allocated $1 trillion to a single, highly controversial weapons 
program30 (a questionable investment which may have been cut or severely 
reduced if our politics were not so corrupt31), the benefits of such financing 
appear far greater than its costs. 
On the other hand, such funding programs could open the door to 
spending arms races—exactly what the drafters of the “millionaire 
amendment” at issue in Davis feared. Private campaign funders’ return on 
investment has been estimated at 22,000%.32 Shifting the direction of state 
subsidies and costs can lead to vast fortunes. In light of this possibility, 
outright restrictions on privately financed candidates’ spending (and 
expenditures on their behalf) must be explored. Other advanced countries 
have such rules, and few would seriously argue that Canada or Germany are 
“less democratic” than the United States on account of these restrictions. It 
is far easier to make the opposite case: that the United States’ pattern of 
runaway inequality and extreme wealth concentration has created a pattern 
of self-reinforcing advantage among those connected enough to convert 
money into power, and vice versa, ad infinitum.33 
This brings us back to Justice Kagan’s dissent in Bennett, and her insightful 
opening. It is worth quoting at length, since it identifies the stakes so well: 
Imagine two States, each plagued by a corrupt political system. In both 
States, candidates for public office accept large campaign contributions in 
exchange for the promise that, after assuming office, they will rank the 
donors’ interests ahead of all others. As a result of these bargains, politicians 
ignore the public interest, sound public policy languishes, and the citizens 
lose confidence in their government. 
Recognizing the cancerous effect of this corruption, voters of the first 
State, acting through referendum, enact several campaign finance measures 
previously approved by this Court. They cap campaign contributions; require 
disclosure of substantial donations; and create an optional public financing 
 
30 Zachary Cohen, The F-35: Is the World’s Most Expensive Weapons Program Worth It?, CNN 
POL. (July 16, 2015, 3:25 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/16/politics/f-35-jsf-operational-costs 
[https://perma.cc/EL68-WPF7]. 
31 See id. (noting that the legislative committees responsible for defense appropriations were 
the “biggest targets” of political contributions by defense companies, whose combined donations 
reached almost $12 million in 2014). 
32 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: THE CORRUPTION OF EQUALITY AND THE 
STEPS TO END IT 101 (2015) (citing a study measuring “the return on lobbyists’ investment to 
modify the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 to create a tax benefit”). 
33 See generally Paolo Liberati, The World Distribution of Income and Its Inequality, 1970–2009, 61 
REV. INCOME & WEALTH 248 (2015) (comparing the Gini coefficient worldwide over time); 
Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 3 (discussing anti-oligarchy principles and the Constitution); Gilens 
& Page, supra note 6 (analyzing work on voice and class in U.S. democracy). 
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program that gives candidates a fixed public subsidy if they refrain from 
private fundraising. But these measures do not work. Individuals who 
“bundle” campaign contributions become indispensable to candidates in need 
of money. Simple disclosure fails to prevent shady dealing. And candidates 
choose not to participate in the public financing system because the sums 
provided do not make them competitive with their privately financed 
opponents. So the State remains afflicted with corruption. 
Voters of the second State, having witnessed this failure, take an ever-so-slightly 
different tack to cleaning up their political system. They too enact 
contribution limits and disclosure requirements. But they believe that the 
greatest hope of eliminating corruption lies in creating an effective public 
financing program, which will break candidates’ dependence on large donors 
and bundlers. These voters realize, based on the first State’s experience, that 
such a program will not work unless candidates agree to participate in it. And 
candidates will participate only if they know that they will receive sufficient 
funding to run competitive races. So the voters enact a program that carefully 
adjusts the money given to would-be officeholders, through the use of a 
matching funds mechanism, in order to provide this assurance. The program 
does not discriminate against any candidate or point of view, and it does not 
restrict any person’s ability to speak. In fact, by providing resources to many 
candidates, the program creates more speech and thereby broadens public 
debate. And just as the voters had hoped, the program accomplishes its 
mission of restoring integrity to the political system. The second State rids 
itself of corruption. 
A person familiar with our country’s core values—our devotion to 
democratic self-governance, as well as to uninhibited, robust, and wide-open 
debate—might expect this Court to celebrate, or at least not to interfere with, 
the second State’s success. But today, the majority holds that the second 
State’s system—the system that produces honest government, working on 
behalf of all the people—clashes with our Constitution. The First 
Amendment, the majority insists, requires us all to rely on the measures 
employed in the first State, even when they have failed to break the 
stranglehold of special interests on elected officials. I disagree.34 
I disagree as well, and as the 2016 presidential campaign grinds on, 
Kagan’s insights on the corrosive effects of the dominance of big money 
appear all the more prescient. The increasingly fascistic Trump campaign—which 
has darkly suggested the revision of libel law in order to punish its enemies 
 
34 Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2829-30 (2011) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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in the press35—is fueled by suspicion of government as a crony capitalist 
playground of favors exchanged and influence peddled. That is exactly the 
type of legitimacy crisis laws like Arizona’s were designed to forestall. Just as 
the “Constitution is not a suicide pact,” the First Amendment is not a one-way 
ticket to an electoral wild west, where any deployment of funds is instantly 
apotheosized into sacred speech. Nor does it give carte blanche to an 
ideologically motivated Supreme Court to freeze into place current 
inequalities in voice and influence. Bennett should be overruled as soon as an 
opportunity for doing so arises. While such a reversal would by no means 
“fix” campaign finance, it would at least remove one of the most troubling 
roadblocks to fair electoral contests. 
 
 
Preferred Citation: Frank Pasquale, First Amendment Freeze Play: 
Bennett’s Strategy for Entrenching Inequality, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 215 
(2016), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/164-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-215.pdf. 
 
 
 
35 Callum Borchers, Donald Trump Vowed to ‘open up’ Libel Laws to Make Suing the Media Easier. 
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